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NOTE AND COMMENT 
Tm "RIGHT" To Bru;;AK A CoNTRACT.-It is common lmowledge that the 
fully developed common law affords no means to compel the performance 
of a contract according to its terms. Does it follow from this that there 
is no legal obligation to perform a contract, or if obligation there be, that it 
is alternative: to perform or pay damages? A note in the XIV MICH. L. 
Rsv. 48o appears to give an affirmative answer to this question and at least 
one court (Frye v. Hubbell, 74 N. H. 358, at p. 374) has taken the same 
view. Probably the most forcible exposition of this position is given by 
Justice Holmes in his admirable ·address, "TH£ PATH oF TH£ LAW" (Io 
HARv. L. R.£v. at p. 462). The passage is sufficiently picturesque to deserve 
quotation: ''Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more 
manifest than in the law of contract. Among other things, here again the 
so called primary rights and duties are invested with a mystic significance 
beyond what can be assigned and explained. The duty to keep a contract at 
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not 
keep it,-and nothing else. If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a 
compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are liable to pay a com-
pensatory sum unless the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the 
difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils 
of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as 
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they can. It was good enough for Lord Coke, however, and here, as in 
many other cases, I am content to abide with him." 
Why was it good enough for Lord Coke? Perhaps the history of the 
common law affords some explanation. Pollock and Maitland have shown 
(HIST. oP ENG. LAW (ed. 2) II, 595 ff.) that specific relief is certainly as 
old, probably older than the action for damages. In the time of Glanville 
'damages' are a novelty. A plaintiff goes to the king's court and asks for a 
specific thing, of which the defendant unjustly 'deforces' him. He does not 
want money, compensation ; he wants and gets the specific thing. Of the 
oldest group of actions there is not one which is an action for damages. It 
is true that most of the judgments in favor of plaintiffs are judgments 
awarding seisin of land (Poi:.i.ocK AND MA!Ti:.AND, op. cit., II, 523), but the 
law, not content to stop at this, aimed at specific relief even in case of the 
breach of a contractual obligation. Putting aside the action of Debt, where 
the specific character of the relief may be a coincidence, some insight into the 
attitude of the early common law may be gained from the action of Covenant. 
This action was probably invented for the protection of the termor, who had 
no real right in the land, only the benefit of a covenant. But the relief which 
he obtained was not damages, as a case in 1226 (BRACTON's NO'tF. BooK, pl. 
1739) shows beyond question. A lessor broke his agreement (conuencio) 
that his lessee should hold the land for ten years. The court decided that the 
agreement must be kept and that the plaintiff should recover seisin, or, as we 
should say, possession, of the land. (Et icleo consicleratum est quocl conuen-
cio teneatur et quocl Hugo habeat seisinam suam usque ad terminum suum 
* * * ) If this is not a judgment for the 'specific performance' of the cove-
nant, it is difficult to say what it is. But of course a judge of the thirteenth 
century, as an ecclesiastic, would probably have no scruples about importing 
ethics into the law I Such a judgment, however, is no isolated phenomenon. 
Cf. HAz£I.TINF., EARI.Y HISTORY oP ENGI.ISH EQu1TY,.EsSAYS IN Lr:GAL HIS-
TORY (ed. Vinogradoff) 26g, ff.; Poi:.i.ocK AND MAITI.AND, op. cit. II, 595. It 
was thoroughly in keeping with the spirit of the common law at its great 
formative period. Bracton probably gave expression to a truism when he 
wrote (fol. 413 b): "* * * Tot erunt formulae brevium quot sunt genera 
actionum * * *·" There may be as many forms of action as there are causes 
of action; that is to say, the remedy necessarily follows the right and the first 
inquiry should always be: What is the right? If there be a right, it should 
have an appropriate remedy. And the judges seemed convinced that the obli-
gation of the covenantor was to perform his covenant. An action was in-
vented to compel him so to do. 
Had the common law continued its organic development, it is possible 
that specific relief might have been the rule rather than the exception; but 
the gradually encroaching power of parliament stifled its growth. The STAT-
UTE oP WALES struck a heavy blow at Covenant, and the conservatism of the 
judges robbed that action of its possible contributions to the law of contract. 
The chancery did vary some formulas to suit new cases, but this power was 
used rarely and with great caution. The inevitable result was that the 
medireval common law became a law about remedies. See Maitland in 3 
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HARV. L. IO:v. 97. In the Y~ BooKS there is little or no talk of substantive 
law; it is procedure with which the judges are occupied. No longer is any 
such work as that of Bracton possible; for the laWYer is interested in the 
nature of writs, not of rights. Thus Bracton's striking statement remains 
true only if inverted. From the forms of action the causes of action must 
be deduced. There is~ right only where there is a remedy. And the remedy 
for breach of contract is found in what was originally a tort action; naturally 
it sounds only in damages. It is not difficult, therefore, to see why the medire-
val laWYer, constrained to think in the terms of remedies, should regard the 
right of the promisee as confined to damages only. There could be no obli-
gation to perform a contract if the chancery afforded no writ to enforce such 
an obligation. · 
It may be that some such thought was present in the mind of Lord Coke. 
In Bromage v. Genning (1 Roll. R 368; AMES, CAsss IN EQurry ]URISDIC-
'l'ION, JS, n.) a plaintiff sought a prohibition from the King's Bench against 
a suit for specific performance of a lease, on the ground that the proper rem-
edy was an action at law. Coke was clearly of opinion that a court of equity 
should not decree specific performance for that "this would subvert the in-
tent of the covenantor, since he intended to have his election to pay dam-
ages or to make the lease, and they would compel him to make the lease 
against his will * * *·" It is no coincidence that the year of this decision, 1616, 
was the very year· of the bitter controversy between Lord Coke and Lord 
Ellesmere, the results of which are familiar to every one. The supremacy 
of the court of Chancery was established, and, as Ames has well said, Lord 
Coke's defeat in his contest with Lord Ellesmere was matched by his failure 
to check the jurisdiction of the chancellor in matters of contract. Ames, 
loc. cit. Coke took a purely formal view of the obligation of the promisor. 
Though he may have justified it 'to· himself by reasoning from remedy to 
right, he was no doubt eager to find any basis upon which to challenge the 
jurisdiction of Chancery. One can scarcely regard his a~tude as other than 
that of a special pleader. 
Equity has taken a substantial view. . In decreeinEf specific performance 
it enforces the contractual obligation of the promisor according to the terms 
of his promise, so far as that is possible. But the obligation is a legal obliga-
tion and equity is acting in aid of a legal right. That the obligation is essen-
tially legal, though not enforced specifically by a court of law, may be seen 
if the matter be looked at from another angle. Where there has been a 
repudiation of a contract or a material breach, the aggrieved party is not al-
ways driven to an action for damages, even when he may not resort to equity. 
If he has himself performed in whole or in part, he may elect to disregard 
the contract and demand restitution in value for what he has done. He has 
thus a "right to restitution as an alternative remedy instead of compensation 
in damages". WILLisroN's WALD'S POLLOCK ON CoN'tRACTS, p. 334 ff. The 
primary right remains, however, the right to performance; the only primary 
obligation is the obligation to perform the contract. WoonWABD, QUASI CoN-
'l'RACTS, § 200. What becomes, th.en, of the right to break a contract? What 
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:has befallen the promisor's prediction that he will only pay damages if he 
does not perform? Specific performance in equity and restitution at law 
give a pertinent answer to these questions. 
. Undoubtedly the promisor who cannot be compelled to perform his prom-
jse does have some definite legal capacity. It seems more accurate to de-
scribe this as a power,-a power to break the contract. As Professor Hoh-
feld has pointed out in a spirited article (FUNDAMJ;NTAJ. L'eGAJ. CoNCJU'TIONS, 
23 YAJ.i:: L. JotJRN. I6, ff.), right and duty are correlative terms. There can 
be no right without a duty. But the correlative of power is liability. Thus 
the promisor may have the ability or power to alter the legal relations grow-
ing out of the contract, to create in himself a liability. The duty of the 
_promisor is, with due respect to Justice Holmes, to perform his promise, 
but by the exercise of a power he may in certain cases convert this duty 
into a liability. The exercise of a power in such case is wrongfnl but effect-
ual; for it is of the essence of a power that it may alter, divest, or create 
rights. 
It is submitted, therefore, that neither the history of the common law 
nor logic sustains the proposition that there is no legal obligation to perform 
.a contract or, conversely, that there is a right to break a contract. To sup-
port such a notion is to hark back to the later YEAR Booxs which ascribe 
J>roperty (propretie) to the trespasser, even to the thief, because, forsooth, 
the owner has no action against the third hand. Cf. Pou.ocK AND MA!Tr.AND, 
.op. cit., II, 156, ff. 'fhe unhappy results of this vicious process of reasoning 
are sufficiently striking to warn us of the danger involved in a similar mis-
take today. W. T. B. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF S"eGR£GATION 0RDINANC§.-The effort of various 
-southern states to segregate white persons and colored ones into mutually 
.exclusive residential districts has received a final quietus, unless the Supreme 
Court of the· United States shall reverse itself, by the decision in Buchanan 
v. Warley, handed down November 5, Ig17. The suit in this case was for 
.specific performance of a contract to buy land. The contract expressly stip-
-ulated that the buyer, a colored man, was not to be held to his purchase 
unless he had "the right under the laws of the state of Kentucky and 
the city of Louisville to ocupy said property as a residence." His ob-
j ection to performance was based on the fact that an ordinance of the 
city forbade persons of one color "to move into and occupy as a res-
idence" a house in any block in which a majority of houses were already 
-Occupied by persons of the other color. The ordinance expressly excluded 
from its operation persons who had already acquired the right of occupancy 
-0f a building or had, by previous rental, established the color of occupancy. 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky had held this ordinance to be valid and, 
liecause of the terms of the contract, a defense to the suit for performance. 
'The Federal Supreme Court reversed this decision and declared the ordi-
nance unconstitutional. 'fhe court comments upon the ordinance in some 
.respects as though it denied rights to colored persons only, but the court's 
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opinion is not predicated on this, and the ordinance does in fact apply to-
both races alike. 
The enactment would undeniably have restricted the use of property and 
limited the owner's normal ability to dispose of it. But the court expressly 
concedes that, "dominion over property springing from ownership, is not 
absolute and unqualified. The disposition and use of property may be con-
trolled in the exercise of the police power in the interest of public health, 
convenience, or welfare." It predicates the invalidity of the ordinance upo11; 
the sole premise that the particular restraint in this case is not "due process". 
The court continually uses the phrase "due process" as though it were a 
unique quality, determinable in and of itself. The context shows, however, 
that it is given the customary meaning of reasonable promotion of the public-
welfare. For a criticism of the idea that "due process" is a unique charac-
teristic of legislation, see 22 YAI.-e L. JoURN. 5I9. 
In holding the ordinance to be unreasonable the court not only i::everses 
the decision of the state Supreme Court but is in conflict with the opinion 
of courts of other states. In State v. Gurry, I2I Md. 534. 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
Io87, I2 MICH. L. R.Ev. 2I5 (I9I3), a similar residential segregation ordinance 
was held invalid, but only because it made no exception, in its operation, of 
rights of occupancy acquired before its enactment. As the court pointed out,. 
it might have prevented one who was already the owner of a house, before· 
passing of the ordinance, from afterward occupying it himself. To this ex-
tent the enactment was said to be unreasonable, but its main objective was-
declared to be quite within the legislative power to regulate property rights. 
It was acknowledged by counsel for both sides that there had been more or-
less friction resulting from the occupancy by colored people of houses in 
blocks theretofore white. "With this acknowledgment,'' said the court, "how 
can it be contended that the City Council, charged with looking to the welfare 
of the city, is seeking to make an unreasonable use of the police power, 
when it enacts a law which, in their opinion, will tend to prevent the con-
flict?" "* * * We are of the opinion that the object sought to be accomplished 
by this ordinance is one which properly admits of the exercise of the police 
power." In Ashland v. Coleman, I9 VA. LAW REG. 427, decided the same 
year, an ordinance making it unlawful for a person of one color to occupy 
as a residence any house in a block already occupied by a majority of house-
holders of the other color, and excepting rights of occupancy already ac-
quired, was held to be reasonable and valid. In Carey v. Atlanta, I43 Ga. 
I92, L. R. A. I9I5D, 684; I3 MICH. L. R.Ev. 599 a residential segregation ordi-
nance was declared invalid. This opinion was predicated, however, not on 
the ground that residential segregation had no reasonable connection with 
the public welfare, but on the premise that the "due process" clause pre-
cludes any restriction of an owner's right to dispose of his property. The 
principal case expressly repudiates this premise. In another Georgia case 
of this year, Harden v. Atlanta, Ga., 93 S. E. 40I (Aug. I9I7) an ordinance 
almost identical with that of the principal case was upheld as constitutional. 
This court said, "A reasonable restraint upon alienation of property by indi-
viduals not {)llly pervades our statute law, but is found in our state Consti-
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tution." The enactment in question the court declared to be a reasonable, 
proper and valid restraint, saying, "If it be justifiable to separate the races. 
in the public schools in recognition of the peril to race integrity, induced by 
mere race association, then we cannot see why the same public policy cannot 
be invoked to prohibit the black and white races from living side by side.. 
* * * An ordinance designed to accomplish this purpose will be upheld, not-
withstanding that to some extent the use of property may be somewhat re-
stricted * * *." And again, ''We do not think the ordinance either unreason-
able or opposed to the Constitution of this state or of the United States upon 
the grounds stated." 
Statutes segregating the races in schools and conveyances are now of ad-
mitted reasonableness and constitutionality. Berea College v. Kentucky, 2u 
U. S. 45; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537; Hart v. State, 100 Md. 595. In 
attempting to distinguish the residential segregation law from those allowing 
segregation in transportation, the court is evidently actuated by a feeling-
that property may be less readily subjected to restriction for the public good 
than liberty may be. This idea appears in Ives v. So. Buffalo R. R. Co., 201 
N. Y. 271 and is repudiated in such cases as Noble State Bk. v. Haskell, 219 
U. S. 104- See also, 15 MICH. L. Rl;v. 292. 
After all this direct and emphatic expression of opinion that the ordinance 
was reasonably necessary and conducive to public welfare it is surprising: 
that the Supreme Court should have declared it unreasonable and, therefore, 
unconstitutional. When both the legislative and judicial departments of four-
states have explicitly declared it reasonable, one can not pretend that it is. 
"arbitrary" or "palpably and unmistakably in excess of any reasonable exer-
cise of authority'' or even that it is "clearly" unreasonable. In declaring 
the ordinance void without such obvious unreasonableness, the court has ex-
ceeded the limits of its privilege as fixed by judicial declaration ever since 
the right of review has been exercised. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas 409; 
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 385, 3g8; Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718; 
Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207; Lochner v. New York, 1g8 U.S. 45, 68 (dis-
senting opinion) ; Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137; Sclimidiuger v. Chi-
cago, 226 U.S. 578. 
Oddly enough, the two cases which the court cites in support of its deci-
sion that the ordinance can not stand, namely, Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S-
425, and Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 6o6, are decisions upholding the respective 
enactments in question on the ground that, whatever the court may think as 
individuals, the enactments were not so "clearly and unmistakably'' unreason-
able that the court could override the legislature. While it is not probable 
that the court will change its mind in regard to residential segregation, such 
reversal of opinion would not be without precedent. In Wright v. Hart, 18z 
N. Y. 330, the court held a "bulk sales" statute unconstitutional, because not 
reasonably conducive to public welfare, despite the fact that similar statutes. 
had been enacted in twenty other states. Eleven years later, in Klein v. 
Maravelas, 219 N. Y. 383, the court frankly admitted that "the decision in 
Wright v. Hart is wrong," and it upheld a "very similar" statute as reasonable 
and constitutional. J. B. W. 
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EQml'ABLS RsntMPl'lON OF A MoRl'GAGS AFl'tR Fo&:eCLOSURt.-S was the 
owner of land subject to three successive mortgages held by A, B, and C 
respectively. B's incumbrance was for a loan of $1,500, for which S subse-
quently gave B, as additional security, notes of D for an equal amount. C 
assigned his mortgage to B and B foreclosed it by advertisement and sale, 
himself purchasing at the sale subject to prior incumbrances. During the 
statutory period of redemption D and E paid B the $1,500 due on their notes, 
which B accepted and retained. S being out of the state most of the time 
and ignorant of whether there had been a foreclosure sale, or, if there had, 
when the year of redemption expired, on several occasions applied to B for 
information and was always turned away with evasive and vague answers 
until the statutory period expired without hi.s knowledge. Afterwards he 
brought his bill to redeem. The trial court found the land of suaicient value 
to pay all incumbrances. Held, that S might redeem from the foreclosure 
sale. Nothing is said as to redemption from the second mortgage but, as that 
debt had been paid, the decree presumably pr.ovided for its discharge. Sletten 
v. First Nat. Bank of Carrington (N. D. 1917), 163 N. W. 534-
This decision is rested on two grounds, the first of which is that B had 
defeated S's statutory right of redemption by acts of bad faith. 
The statutes allowing redemption from a foreclosure sale have been held 
to be strictly mandatory and to be complied with literally. Teabout v. Jaffray 
and Co., 74 Ia. 29, 7 Am. St. Rep. 465, and cases .collected in note p. 469. 
Failure to redeem during the statutory period because of ignorance or negli-
gence are not grounds for subsequent redemption. Campau v. Godfrey, 18 
Mich. z;. Nor will inability to attend to business because of physical or men-
tal debility be grounds for relief, Wallace v. Monroe, 22 Ill. App. 6o2. 
On the other hand, although the law has been fully complied with, equity 
may allow a subsequent redemption where the statutory right is rendered 
nugatory by fraud, or unfair conduct. A parol agreement to extend the time 
beyond the statutory period has been held binding. Southard v. Pope's E~­
ecutor, 9 B. Mon. 261. Butt v: Butt, 91 Ind. 305. McMakin v. Schenck, g8 
Ind. 264. Guimi v. Locke, 38 Tenn. 110. These cases are not based primarily 
on the ground that there is an enforceable contract, but upon the ground that 
the promise makes it inequitable for the purchaser to retain his legal ad-
vantage. It would seem to follow that any conduct which lulls the mort-
gagor into security or inaction until the statutory period has expired gives 
him a right to redeem subsequently. 
In the case of Graff am v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 18o, land was sold on an 
attachment and judgment in rem, the judgment debtor at the time being in 
another state. Valuable real estate was chosen when a great amount of 
chattel property was available, a single piece of which would have satisfied 
the judgment. The property was sold for a pittance to the judgment creditor. 
During the year of redemption the judgment debtor lived on the premises 
for part of the time expending large sums in its repair, all of which the 
judgment creditor knew, he keeping constant watch of her movements and 
taking every practical precaution to keep her in ignorance until the year of 
redemption had expired. When the period had expired he took possession. 
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The Supreme Court allowed subsequent redemption on the ground of "fraud." 
Justice Miller, with whom concurred Justices Woods, Matthews and Gray, 
dissented, saying, "In addition to the sanctity which the law concedes to 
judicial sales, founded on well-considered reasons of policy as old as the law 
itself, the favor of allowing the debtor one year more to save his land, after 
judgment and sale under execution have fixed his rights, only adds to his 
obligation to exercise the right thus granted in strict accordance with its 
terms * * * Yet after Graffam had acquired a complete legal title under 
judicial proceedings which were unimpeachable, the court treats the case 
as if the whole matter was still iii fieri and gives further time for redemption. 
* * * I dissent from the judgment and opinion of the court as leading to 
evil results, in discrediting judicial sales, and embarrassing the due and just 
exercise of the right of redemption, by turning it into a question of judicial 
discr.etion." Despite the vigor of the dissent, this case has never been im-
peached by the Supreme Court and has at least been cited once as authority 
without criticism. Brophy v. Kelly, 2u Fed. 22. See also Hammersham v. 
Fairall, 44 Ia. 462; Palmer v. Douglas, 107 Ill. 204 
It is to be noted that in the case of Graff am v. Burges.s, above, the Supreme 
Court laid stress on the fact that the judgment debtor was a woman unskilled 
in business, suggesting a distinction if she were a man capable of taking care 
of his business, pp. 185-86; that in Hammersham v. Fairall, supra, the mort-
gagor was an ignorant woman and that in Palmer v. Douglas, supra, the mort-
gagor was an aged and illiterate man. 
In the principal case the Supreme Court of North Dakota saw fit to allow 
redemption where the statutory requirements were fully complied with, and 
the mortgagor was a man requiring no exceptional protection. The fraud 
is summed up in this conclusion of the court: ''When Sletten's obligations to 
the bank are compared with the security given and realized upon, and when 
consideration is given to the rather indefinite and somewhat evasive answers 
of Newberry in response to requests for information, continuing almost to 
the very date of the expiration of the period of redemption, it can hardly be 
said that the bank acted with that degree of good faith that would be mani-
fested by one whose sole interest was to collect a debt justly owing with inter-
est and costs." 
The case goes further than prior decisions, but seems not to exceed the 
principles of equitable control of legal rights. 
The second ground of the decision of this case was that when B pur-
chased on the foreclosure 0:£ the third mortgage, subject to the prior mort-
gages, the land became the primary fund for the payment of the prior mort-
gages; that, as the second of these mortgages was owned by B, that mort-
gage merged in the equity of redemption which he had acquired by the pur-
chase, and the second mortgage debt was discharged; and that, by subse-
quently accepting payment of that debt, B waived his rights as a purchaser 
and treated the land as a mere security for the payment of both debts. 
This application of the doctrine of merger, while exceptional, seems satis-
factory. That, in such a case, there is a merger, and that, where the land is 
amply sufficient to pay all incumbrances, the mortgage debt is thereby satis-
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fied, is supported by the cases cited by the court. See also Jackson v. Tift, 
15 Ga. 557; Knowles v. Lawton, 18 Ga. 476; Northwestern Bank v. Stone, 
'97 Ia. 183; Spencer v. Harford, 4 Wend. 381. Given the discharge of the 
senior mortgage by merger, a subsequent payment of the senior mortgage 
debt involves an unjust enrichment of the mortgagee. The natural remedy 
therefor would seem to be restitution to the mortgagor of the money so paid, 
"hut in this case the mortgagor seeks to recover his land on the theory of re-
-0.emption. That accepting subsequent payment of a debt satisfied by fore-
closure, or otherwise recognizing its continuing existence, is a waiver by 
the purchaser of the right to an indefeasible title and a treating of the land · 
as security is sustained by authority. Williams v. Bolt, 170 Mich. 517; Louns-
.bury v. Norto1i, 59 Conn. 170; Southard v. Pope's E:r;ecutor, supra. It would 
seem, by analogy, that the court is justified in holding that acceptance of 
payment of the debt discharged by merger, incidental to the foreclosure, has 
the same effect. It should be noted, however, that where a statutory right 
of redemption from foreclosure sale exists, the foreclosure is incomplete or 
inchoate during the period of redemption. It would seem to follow that 
-during this period the purchaser in our case was entitled to receive payment 
.on his senior mortgage and to retain such payment if redemption was ulti-
-mately made. But since no redemption was made the foreclosure may be 
regarded as having been perfected ab initio, and the doctrine of merger may 
:be applied as if no period of redemption had intervened. 
R. A. F. 
LIAll:ILITY OF PUBLIC 0FFIC$ FOR THS Loss OF PRIVATS FUNDS ENTRUSTI!D 
"to His KaPING.-There is much contrariety of decision concerning the lia-
oility of public officers for the loss of funds with which they have been en-
-trusted. A recent case illustrates some of the more important phases of the 
law of such a situation. People for use of Hoyt et al. v. McGrath et al. 
(Ill. 1917), II7 N. E. 74. In this case the public brought an action of debt 
-on the official bond of the clerk of court for the use of Hoyt and others. 
Usees had tendered into court a sum of money which the clerk took under 
the court's order to receive and hold it, but refused to pay it over to the 
11sees as directed by a later order of the court, claiming the money-had been 
Teceived by him in his individual capacity and had been lost without his fault 
by the failure of the bank in which it had been deposited. Held, that as a 
-public officer is liable as an insurer for private funds received by virtue of 
ms office, the failure of the clerk to pay over the money in question con-
·stituted a breach of his official statutory bond. 
The public officer, on the theory of the existence of a debtor-creditor rela-
1ion between the public corporation and the officer with respect to the public 
funds in his possession, on the ground of public policy, because the loss 
-0curs by reason of the unauthorized acts of the officer, as for example, the 
unauthorized deposit of public funds in a bank which later fails, or on ac-
count of the language of the bond or of the statute defining the duties of 
-:the officer, is generally held absolutely liable as an insurer for the safety of 
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:Public funds entrusted to him. Fairchild v. Hedges, 14 Wash. 117; County 
of Mecklenburg v. Beales, 111 Va. 691, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 285; Northern 
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Owens, 86 Minn. 188; State v. Bobleter, 83 Minn. 479; Es-
.tate of Ramsay v. People, 197 Ill. 572, 90 Am. St. Rep. 177. To this rule of 
Jiability exceptions have generally been made of cases where the funds hav~ 
.been lost without the officer's fault, solely by act of God or the public enemy, 
United States v. Thomas, 15 Wall. 337 (act of public enemy); Thompson v. 
Board of Trustees, 30 Ill. 99 (dicta); State v. Lee, 72 Miss. 281 (dicta); 
Maloy v. Board of County Commissioners, 10 N. Mex. 638. A few cases 
refuse to make even these exceptions. Havens v. Lathene, 75 N. Car. 505; 
State v. W alsen, 17 Colo. 170. In some states, however, the rule is estab-
lished that the officer having custody of public moneys is relieved from re-
sponsibility for the loss of funds which he has exercised due care and dili-
gence to preserve. Livingsto1i v. Woods, 20 Mont. 91; State v. Copeland, g6 
Tenn. 2g6; State v. Gramm, 7 Wyo. 329. This is clearly the minority rule. 
The case noted is of especial interest because the funds in question were 
,Private, not public, funds. Some few courts have drawn a distinction in cases 
-0f this sort between public and private funds, and hold the officer liable as a 
bailee for hire in event of the loss of funds of the latter class. Gartley v. 
People, 28 Colo. 227; People v. Faulkner, 107 N. Y. 477. The reason some-
times offered for such distinction is that as the public corporation is not lia-
ble for the loss of funds where there is no negligence, so the officer, the 
.agent of the public corporation, ought not to be. It is frequently unsafe to 
apply the analogy of agency in cases involving officers. Officers are frequently 
liable for injury or loss when the public corporation which he serves is not 
liable. So the reason offered is not convincing. In People v. Faulkner, supra, 
:the reason suggested for the distinction between public and private funds is 
the greater degree of watchfulness and scrutiny which the owner of private 
funds gives to the acts of an officer who has custody of his funds. This 
reason is not very convincing, and it seems that the attempted distinction 
might well be disregarded and the officer held to the same liability for loss 
of private funds and for the loss of those of the public. In the great mass 
of cases involving liability of the officer for loss of funds without his fault 
the distinction has not been raised. Shaw v. Bauman, 34 Ohio St. 25; Smith 
v. Patton, 131 N. Car. 396; Phillips v. Lamar, 27 Ga. 228. 
G. S. 
Exr:cUTioN SALES AS PluW1':R!':N'l'IAL TRANSFJ>RS IN BANKRUP'l'CY.-In the re-
.cent case of Golden Hill Distilling Co. v. Logue, 243 Fed. 34?, the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holds that a "creditor who recovers 
a judgment, by consent or in invitum, and by execution sale collects his 
money within four months preceding bankruptcy, and with reasonable cause 
to believe [that a preference would thereby be effected] receives a voidable 
-preference, which he must repay to the trustee." 
This question is one that has vexed the bankruptcy courts ever since the 
'Supreme Court of the United States in Clarke v. Larremore, 188 U. S. 486, 
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declined to answer it. It usually arises· under circumstances as follows: C 
sues his insolvent debtor, B, obtains a judgment against him, issues and levies 
an execution, and sells under the levy. If the bankruptcy of B intervenes at 
this point, before the sheriff has turned over to C the proceeds of the execu.: 
tion sale, it is clear under the decision in Clarke v. Larremore that if the 
judgment is less than four months old it is avoided and the property affected 
by its lien is discharged and released from the same by the provisions of 
§ 67f of the BANKRUPtCY Ac:r of 18g8 which reads in part as follows : "* * * 
all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal pro-
ceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months 
prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed 
null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by 
the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be deemed wholly dis-
charged and released from the same * * *·" And it is equally clear that under 
these cireumstances it is immaterial whether the creditor has, or has not, any 
information or notice as to his debtor's insolvency or intent to prefer. 
But what if the sheriff has already turned over to C the proceeds of the 
execution sale before B becomes bankrupt? It will make the problem simpler 
to assume, as before, that B's bankruptcy ensues within four months of the 
entry of the judgment, though, as will be pointed out later, it may be that 
this requirement is not absolutely necessary. Although there was some early 
difference of opinion on the point, it seems to be now settled that the effect 
of § 67f is to strike down, not the judgment itself, but only the lien of the 
judgment. Rl<:M1NG'tON, BANKRUPtCY, §§ 777, 1M8; Doyle v. Heath, 22 R. I. 
213; Pope v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 152 Wis. 6n; Rodolf v. First Nat. 
Bank, 30 Okla. 631, Q40. It has accordingly been held in numerous cases that 
under the circumstani:es shown above-where the lien of the judgment is no 
longer in question, having disappeared at the time of the execution sale-
§ 67f does not have the effect of completely avoiding the judgment and all 
the proceedings under it; and a proceeding brought under § 67£ against the 
creditor who has received the proceeds of the execution sale must therefore 
fail. Botts v. Hammond, 99 F.ed. 916, 40 C. C. A. 179; In re Blair, 102 Fed. 
g87; In re Knickerbocker, 121 Fed. 1004; Levor v. Seiter, 74 N. Y. Supp. 499, 
6g App. Div. 33; Johnson v. A11derson, 70 Neb. 233; Greene v. Montana Brew-
ing Co., 28 Mont. 38o; Starbuck v. Gebo, g6 N. Y. Supp. 781, 48 Misc. 333; 
Farrell v. Lockett, IIS Tenn. 494; In re Bailey, 144 Fed. 214; Nelson v. Svea 
Pub. Co., 178 Fed. 136; In re Weitzel, 191 Fed. 463. Two cases (In re Bres-
lauer, 121 Fed. 910, and Staunton v. Wooden, 179 Fed. 61, 102 C. C. A. 355) 
are sometimes cited as holding that § 67£ avoids the judgment in toto, but 
in both of these cases the execution sale took place after bankruptcy, and they 
are thereJore not in point upon the particular question now under examination. 
However, in Dreyer v. Kicklighter, 228 Fed. 744, the District Court for the 
Southern District of Georgia set aside a sale under circumstances like those 
outlined above and held that the trustee in bankruptcy was entitled to recover 
the property from the purchaser at the execution sale, who had been a par-
ticipant in the creditor's fraudulent .intent to secure a preference. In this 
case the court intimated that the purchaser would nevertheless be allowed 
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credit for the amount.he had paid for the property at the execution sale, and 
that the trustee in bankruptcy could then under § 6ob recover the same amount 
from the execution creditor to whom it had been paid by the sheriff who made 
the sale; this on the ground that the execution creditor had been preferred 
by the transaction, and had had reasonable ground to believe that a prefer-
ence was to be effected. 
This brings us to the question as to whether or not, under the circum-
stances outlined above, the trustee in bankruptcy, failing to recover under 
§ 67f, is entitled to recover under § 6ob, which reads in part as follows: "If 
a bankrupt shall have procur~·J or suffered a judgment to be entered against 
him in favor of any person or have made a transfer of any of his property, 
and if, at the time of the transfer, or of the entry of the judgment, * * * 
and being within four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy 
* * * the bankrupt be insolvent and the judgment or transfer then operate 
as a preference, and the person receiving it or to be benefited thereby * * * 
shall then have reasonable C:l:use to believe that the enforcement of such judg-
ment or transfer would effect a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee 
and he may recover the property or its value from such person." It has been 
held in Galbraith v. Whitaker, II9 Minn. 447; Moore v. John H. Smith & 
Sons, 205 Fed. 431; Anderson v. Stayton State Bank, 82 Ore. 357; and Grant 
v. Nat. Bank of Auburn, 232 Fed. 201, under facts similar to those under 
consideration, that when the creditor has reasonable cause to believe that a 
preference is being effected the trustee in bankruptcy may recover from him 
the value of the property thus sold on execution. The same conclusion is 
reached in ~e principal case. 
The cases which come to this conclusion, however, do not agree as to the 
grounds for their decisions. In Moore v. John H. Smith & Sons, and in 
Anderson v. Stayton State Bank it seems to have been the view of the court 
that it was the f 11dgment that was made voidable by § 6ob and that was 
avoided by the suit of the trustee. The Minnesota court in Galbraith v. Whit-
aker, and the Circuit Court of Appeals in the principal case seem to take the 
view that either the execution sale or else the payment of the proceeds to 
the creditor amounted to a transl er under § 6ob and that it was this transfer 
that was voidable and that was set aside by the trustee's suit. And in Grant 
v. Nat. Bank of Auburn, (which, by the way, is the only one of these four 
cases to be cited in the principal case), Judge Ray intimates that it is the 
preference that is voidable by the trustee. This diversity of opinion is nat• 
ural, for, as stated in the principal case, "it must be conceded that there are, 
in sections 6oa and 6ob, no provisions which in terms, reach the proceeds of 
a satisfied judgment." 
What is it, then, that can be set aside by the trustee under the power 
given him under§ 6ob? It may be: (1) the judgment; (2) the transfer aris. 
ing from the execution sale or the payment of its proceeds, or (3) the pre-
ference, which would probably include both (1) and (2). 
There are obvious objections to the view that it is the judgment that is to 
be avoided. In the first place, under the circumstances we are considering, 
the judgment has been satisfied and is no longer in existence, as is pointed 
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our clearly in the cases cited above as holding that § 67f does not apply to 
this situation. Moreover, the "entry of judgment'' itself does not always 
"operate as a preference," though that is the language of the statute. Fre-
quently something in addition to the entry of the judgment, as docketing, 
recording, or leyy, is required to make the judgment operate as a preference 
by enabling the judgment creditor "to obtain a greater percentage of his 
debt than any other" creditor of the same class. It ·is difficult, therefore, to 
see how, under the circumstances before us, the courts are justified by § 6ob 
in allowing the trustee to recover from the creditor on the ground that the 
judgment is voidable. 
Is the execution sale-as suggested by the Minnesota court-or the pay-
ment of its proceeds-as held in the principal case-such a "transfer'' as is 
contemplated by § 6ob? This construction is of course based on the broad 
definition of "transfer" in § I (25). Though, as the court admits in the prin-
cipal case, the applicability of § 6ob is not clear or certain, at least this con-
struction has some advantages of expediency over the view that it is the 
judgment that is avoided by § 6ob. If we have a transfer, it undoubtedly 
operates as a preference, as required by the section, while, as has been seen, 
the judgment alone does not necessarily have this effect. Moreover, it gives 
less opportunity for the creditor to defeat the trustee's suit on the ground 
that he did not have reasonable ground to believe that a preference was to be 
effected. A creditor might obtain a judgment without having such reasonable 
ground, and yet have it at the time of the execution sale or of the turning 
over of the proceeds. If the "judgment'' view of § 6ob is taken, of course, 
it is his knowledge at the time of the entry of the judgment that is material; 
if the "transfer" view is taken it is his knowledge at the later date of the 
execution sale or of the turning over of the proceeds. In this aspect of the 
case, it is clear that the holding in the principal case-that the turning over 
of the proceeds makes the "transfer"-is preferable to the Minnesota court's 
holding that it is the execution sale . that makes the "transfer," simply be-
cause it refers the test of "reasonable ground to believe'' to a later time. 
Judge Ray's suggestion that it is the "preference" that is voidable is per-
haps open to the objection that it makes less certain the exact time that is to 
be taken for applying the test of "reasonable cause to believe." Otherwise 
it possesses many of the advantages of the view taken in the principal case, 
and is free from one objection that may be urged against the latter view. 
In the principal case the date of the entry of the judgment is not given. 
It is likely that it was within four months before the debtor's bankruptcy, 
but that fact does not clearly appear; and if we are to accept the court's 
statement that the turning over of the proceeds is a "transfer,'' of course the 
preference consists in the transfer, not in the judgment, and the date of the 
judgment becomes immaterial, the critical date being that on which the pro-
ceeds of the execution sale were turned over to the creditor. But it has re-
peatedly been held that after four months from the date of the filing of a 
judgment (perhaps more accurately the date on which it becomes a lien) 
the judgment is immune from attack on the ground of preference, and the 
judgment creditor's preference then becomes a non-voidable preference. This 
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-was distinctly held in Colston v. Austin Run Mining Co., 194 Fed. 929, II4 
C. C. A. 565, and in In re Deer Creek etc. Co., 205 Fed. 205 where the prefer-
ences were being considered as acts of bankruptcy; and it seems to have been 
the view of the Supreme Court in Citizens Banking Co. v. Ravenna Nat. Bank, 
234 U. S., 36o, 367-8, where the same result is admitted and approved. The 
eases are collected in Ri;;i.uNGTON, BANKRUPTCY, §§ 143, 1451. If the principal 
case is to be followed out logically it must be held that a transfer fakes place 
when the proceeds of the execution are paid over to the creditor. If the debt-
or is then insolvent and the transaction results in a preference, an act of 
bankruptcy has been committed; if the creditor then has reasonable cause to 
.believe that a preference will result, the trustee can recover the preference 
from him. This construction of § 6ob practically nu11ifies the requirement 
of the section as to judgments, and upsets the generally accepted view as to 
the impregnability of a judgment more than four months old. To be sure, 
such a judgment might be impregnable as long as the judgment creditor did 
nothing to make it fruitful by sale; as soon as he did this, however, he 
would run the risk of having a bankruptcy proceeding begun, and of having 
to pay back to the trustee any proceeds received from the sale. 
If, however, the judgment in the principal case was obtained within four 
months of the bankruptcy the decision of course applies only to cases where 
such was the fact. And as thus restricted in effect the decision certainly 
reaches a desirable result in perhaps the most desirable way. Inasmuch as 
the court admits that the words of the statute are "far from apt" and do not 
"in terms, reach the proceeds of a satisfied judgment" and as the court calls 
to its support§§ 3a (3), 6oa, 6ob, 67c and 67f, as weU as the 1910 amendment 
1:0 § 6ob, in concluding that the general purpose of the act can only be effect-
uated by the decision arrived at, it seems pretty clear that the suggested re-
striction on the rule can be supported about as weU as the rule itself. It is 
to be hoped that the Supreme Court will uphold the desirable result reached 
·in the principal case. E. H. 
